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Progress in robots’ application to everyday scenarios has increased 
the interest in human-robot interaction (HRI) research. However, 
robots’ limited social skills are associated with decreased humans’ 
positive attitude during HRI. Here, we put forward the idea of 
developing adaptive Theory of Mind (ToM) model-based systems 
for social robotics, able to deal with new situations and interact 
with different users in new tasks.  Therefore, we grouped current 
research from developmental psychology debating the 
computational processes underlying ToM for HRI strategy 
development. Defining a model describing adaptive ToM processes 
may in fact aid the development of adaptive robotic architectures 
for more flexible and successful HRI. Finally, we hope with this 
report to both further promote the cross-talk between the fields of 
developmental psychology and robotics and inspire future 
investigations in this direction. 
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1 Introduction 
Together with the recent introduction of robots in increasing 
everyday scenarios, human-robot interaction (HRI) research has 
rapidly evolved and various types and forms of interactions are 
being investigated [1-3]. However, although research in robots’ 
industrial application has been highly reported, that in areas 
requiring additional social interaction is still at initial stages [4]. 
Indeed, the growing interest of HRI has mainly focused on the 
tuning of specific parameters to increase humans’ positive 
response to robots.  
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An example is provided by [5] which reports an influence of the 
environment conditions on humans’ perception of a “dancing 
robot” performance. Most of these systems, however, do not rely 
on model-based frameworks and overlook the way in which 
humans interact, preventing their adaptation to general situations. 
In fact, building robots as social agents, thus able to autonomously 
infer humans’ intentions and beliefs and to adapt their behaviour 
both in various environments and when interacting with different 
people, remains one of the biggest challenges in robotics [6]. 
Previously [7, 8], we highlighted the need for a cross-talk between 
robotics and developmental psychology as a means to advance 
robots’ social skills and improve HRI. Specifically, we suggested 
the integration of a human-inspired adaptive Theory of Mind 
(ToM) in the architectures for social robots to do so. In addition, 
four main functional advantages of equipping robots with an 
adaptive ToM with respect to current robotic architectures were 
identified, namely belief understanding and tracking, proactivity, 
active perception and learning (see [7] for further details). 
However, human ToM is characterised differently in the literature 
and it is yet to be fully defined [8]. To advance this debate, we thus 
identified a few important questions to be answered which would 
aid the integration of an adaptive ToM model in social robot 
architectures. Among these, is the understanding of which 
computational processes may underlie human ToM development. 
In the next section, a brief description of the main accounts 
suggested as precursors of ToM will be provided, together with 
tables summarising current psychology experiments addressing 
this topic. Finally, their importance for HRI will be highlighted to 
further support this cross-talk between different research fields[9]. 
2 Computational Models Underlying ToM 
In psychology, three main accounts are utilised to describe the 
human ability to understand intentions from observed actions, i.e. 
the association, simulation and teleological theories. The action- 
effect association theory is the simplest one, which states that 
goals are inferred by “simple associations between an observed 
action and the effects that one’s actions have produced” [10]. The 
simulation theory is the next more complex one, according to 
which “actions are understood when the observer directly 
matches, or mirrors, the observed action onto their own motor 
system” [11]. The last teleological theory states that “the outcome 
of an action is seen as the goal, depending on whether it is judged 
to justify the action in the given situation according to the 
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rationality principle” [10]. Here, we provide a summary table (see 
Table 1 below) of state-of-the-art experiments from the world of 
developmental psychology researching infants’ ability to use the 
different accounts during development. We hope to also further 
promote a successful cross-talk between the fields of HRI and 
developmental psychology [9, 12, 13]. Indeed, current robots’ 
architectures generally rely on association and simulation 
principles to enable robots to learn about the social world, 
enabling them to recognize and predict actions from observing 
other agents performing such actions [12, 13].[11, 14-18]  
Table 1. Summary table of developmental psychology 
experiments describing infants’ cognitive ability to predict goal- 
directed actions supported by different computational theories 
 
 
Although several studies provided computational models of ToM 
based on the accounts above described [19, 20], we previously 
debated that such computational processes do not fully explain the 
way in which we are also able to infer abstract mental states (ToM 
components), such as intentions, desires and beliefs (see [7, 8] for 
more details on current robotic architectures for ToM). Similarly, 
we suggest that humans are able to access more complex concepts 
than those described by the previous accounts, which cannot be 
inferred through action observation. Likewise, robots’ recognition 
of complex mental states and their understanding of the humans 
they interact with is limited when based on the mentioned 
theories. For example, although robots can recognize the action of 
displacing objects in a room, they do not understand the deeper 
mental state of the observed agent, e.g., desire to search for 
glasses. However, we proposed that these models may be 
important for and precursors of ToM. Different researchers have 
attempted to link one of these theories and ToM, contributing to 
the debate. Here, we illustrate some of these investigations in 
Table 2 below to both group such proposals, to the best of our 
knowledge, for the first time and inspire future studies in this 
direction. Specifically, we believe that defining whether such 
computational processes can cooperate to build a ToM or whether 
they are mutually exclusive is essential for characterising ToM and 
provide a truthful description of the underlying computational 
processes. This will in turn prove useful for the development of 
adaptive architectures for social robots.[18, 21-23] 
Table 2. Summary of psychology experiments describing 
precursor computational models of human Theory of Mind ability 
3 Conclusion 
In this paper, we grouped some key findings in developmental 
psychology concerning current computational theories describing 
intention understanding from observed actions, which have also 
inspired the development of architectures for social robots. In 
addition, we summarised some current attempts in psychology to 
describe the human higher-level ToM ability for mental states 
inference and propose both psychology and robotics studies to 
continue in this direction. Specifically, we would like to further 
stress the importance of the cross-talk between the two research 
fields. Indeed, understanding how infants develop such social skills 
may be a resource for more adaptive and complex robotic systems, 
improving HRI and increasing the application of robots in 
additional social scenarios. 
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